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New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950 Exchanges, -1954 The Bonds of Brotherhood New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950 Exchanges, -1954 ✣ Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus Schol ars have often noted that the Soviet Union's reluctance to enter the Korean War resulted in signiªcant changes in North Korea's international alignments. Speciªcally, the war induced North Koreans to look less to the Soviet Union for advice, inºuence, and support, and more to the People's Republic of China (PRC). 1 On the battleªeld and behind the front lines, the war accelerated contacts between North Korean leaders and their Chinese comrades. In the postwar period, China behaved generously toward the North Koreans, offering food, material aid, monetary support, and laborers.
Until recently, however, the general lack of primary documents on these topics meant that China's greater importance in North Korean foreign relations in the 1950s was mostly a matter of conjecture. This article uses evidence from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Archive to ªll part of the documentary gap. 2 The documents illuminate a range of issues, including how the PRC dealt with North Korean refugees and retreating soldiers ºooding into China, welcomed North Korean students and cultural groups travel-1. Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 
Sino-Korean Population Movements
In October 1949 the North Korean government became one of the ªrst to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC. After receiving an ofªcial request from DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong on 4 October, Zhou Enlai sent an afªrmative response. 7 Zhou and Pak, however, were merely codifying what had been a loosely structured relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and North Korea for many years. Political, military, economic, and cultural exchange had been taking place along the Sino-Korean frontier throughout the Chinese Civil War. Most signiªcantly, North Korea's northern provinces had served as a strategic sanctuary for People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and supplies during pivotal stages of the civil war in the northeast, sparing many lives and countless goods from Kuomintang destruction. 8 But the Sino-Korean relationship was not just a one-way street beneªting North Korea. Kim Il-Sung was convinced that a Chinese Communist victory would have important political and social implications for his regime. After 1948, when the Chinese Communist victory seemed more and more imminent, North Korean media outlets closely followed campaigns in the war and made special note of each city that fell to the CCP. 9 To readers, this suggested the political tides in East Asia were turning in North Korea's favor, and speculation inevitably arose that Syngman Rhee's fate would soon mirror that of Jiang Jieshi's. By 1949 the Chinese Civil War had become a central event in North Korean society, and the CCP victory was both welcomed and celebrated. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in October capped what had been an important and reciprocal relationship since 1945.
In the spring of 1950, North Korea and the PRC were consolidating power domestically while preparing the grounds for overrunning their respective rival southern states. In this period, communications between Beijing and Pyongyang were sporadic, but one avenue of cooperation for the two Communist states was the return of Korean soldiers and cadres from China. In early 1950, an outstanding matter remained concerning the repatriation to North Korea of ethnic Korean soldiers who had fought with the PLA during the Chinese Civil War. 10 In January 1950, the CCP arranged for representatives of Kim Il-Sung to come to Wuhan to receive some 14,000 Korean soldiers of the Fourth Field Army, along with their weaponry. 11 Although the return of Koreans to China to join Kim Il-Sung's Korean People's Army (KPA) is typically regarded as a pre-Korean War phenomenon, it in fact continued well into the autumn of 1950. 12 Although the numbers sent back were not immense in the summer and fall of 1950, the return of ethnic Korean soldiers, families, workers, and students to North Korea was an extensive process, coordinated at all levels of the Chinese government and military, including the MFA, the Ministry of the Interior, the PLA North China Military Area, the Northeast Foreign Affairs Bureau, and provincial and city governments. The North Korean embassy in China was also an important player in moving repatriations forward. 13 The MFA holdings do not force a radical shift from ªndings in previous scholarship, but the documents do suggest how the returning soldiers augmented KPA strength and technical ability, and they reveal both the social dimensions and the prewar ºuidity between the boundaries of the PLA and the Korean People's Army. In March 1950 the Northern Military District of the PLA was in contact with the MFA in Beijing about returning groups of Korean soldiers. 14 PLA ofªcers took signiªcant time to lay out in detail individual cases of the would-be KPA, providing context for the Koreans who wished to cross the border, changing their national and military afªliations. 15 KPA. 16 In May 1950, as the ethnic Koreans left China to become KPA soldiers, their families stayed behind in the PRC and sought concrete beneªts from PRC bureaucracies. 17 Because the matter of their nationality was complex (many had been in China for a decade or more), no immediate decisions were made about giving these families social beneªts, which would have been on a par with those enjoyed by other Chinese PLA veterans. 18 Data from the MFA Archive do not fundamentally shake the established reasons for Chinese intervention in the Korean War, but the information does describe the care the central leaders in Beijing took in coordinating policy with the North Korean comrades. 19 Mao may have been taken by alarm by the timing of Kim Il-Sung's invasion (an act that threw Mao's Taiwan calculus to the winds and evened the score for the Minsaengdan incident of 1932), but the CCP remained in close contact with the North Korean government in the spring of 1950. Often, repatriation issues were at the core of Sino-North Korean contacts.
With the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula on 25 June 1950, the pace of requests quickened. Many Koreans in China wished to return to Korea to ªght. A survey by the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Northeast People's Government found that 38 male Korean soldiers entered North Korea from Manchuria in June 1950, 8 in July, 61 in August, and 4 in September. August was also the high point for repatriation of North Korean cadres from China. That month, a total of 104 cadres (including 2 females), accompanied by 61 soldiers and 59 workers, returned to Korea. 20 In addition to soldiers, the CCP Central Committee on 18 July ordered the Northeast People's Governmentled by the ubiquitous Gao Gang-to mobilize Korean-nationality doctors, nurses, drivers, mining engineers, and ordnance personnel to return to North Korea, where they "[were] all much needed." 21 Requests for repatriation con- tinued to arrive at the MFA, some from Kim Il-Sung himself, at least into September, and at one point the Northeast People's Government even offered to pay the "household allowances" for Korean drivers returning home. 22 When North Korea made a request to PRC Ambassador Ni Zhiliang to supply 500 soldiers to operate radios, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong criticized the chain of command for such a sensitive issue. The Chinese leaders afterward suggested that these personnel instead be selected "from the Korean students in Yanji"-a further indication that transferring Koreans from northeast China back to North Korea was a recurring issue. 23 The total of 347 repatriations to Korea from Manchuria described in the MFA documents from June to September 1950 is hardly an overwhelming number, but indicates that China was carefully tracking the number of returning Koreans. The number also throws into statistical relief the huge contrast between the small number of Koreans going south from Manchuria and the exponentially increasing numbers of refugees moving in the opposite direction, seeking entrance into China. 24 Given the intense Chinese propaganda support for the North Korean war effort, questions arose about the Korean repatriates and would-be repatriates, who were leaving their families behind in China. The families expected preferential treatment, as had been the case for PLA families in the Chinese Civil War, but the matter ªrst had to be debated in Beijing. 25 in the struggle? The views of local governments on this matter had to be taken into account by the ministries in Beijing, which were themselves handling various requests from localities about Koreans seeking beneªts. 26 Demand for beneªts was such that the MFA had to reply in a blanket statement to all internal affairs bureaus, stating that the families were ineligible for Chinese government funding. Denying PRC beneªts to North Korean-afªliated families in China made them all the more likely to look to Pyongyang for support. 27 However, tensions over these matters were rarely acknowledged in public. Instead, the North Korean attack on the South, the rapid initial "liberation" of Seoul, and the unexpected intervention of the United States in the conºict elicited strident Chinese declarations of support for North Korea. Waves of pro-North demonstrations and publications ºowed throughout China. 28 At the North Korean embassy in Beijing, Kim Il-Sung's neglected channel for conveying his war plan to Mao, diplomats expressed a desire to participate in Chinese activities denouncing the United States for "invading" Taiwan. 29 With such tender steps, the North Korean embassy moved into a position of greater coordination with the Chinese MFA as the two countries plunged forward into the often unwilling embrace of cooperation. The halting internal cooperation between Chinese and North Korean diplomats indicates that, whatever the vehemence of the anti-American demonstrations in Chinese cities and towns, declarations of Sino-North Korean brotherhood did not automatically lead to ºawless coordination in the early Korean War. 30 One aspect of the war that brought the two Communist governments on the Sino-Korean border and the site of extensive bilateral trade via Sinuiju. During the Korean War, it became the gateway for the vast majority of North Koreans ºeeing violence on the peninsula. The North Korean request framed the projected responsibilities of the Andong ofªce as follows: ªrst, to communicate with the DPRK Foreign Ministry and the embassy in China; second, to connect with the commercial delegation of the DPRK in northeast China; and third, to form an ofªce, led by someone at the level of ªrst or second secretary of the North Korean embassy, to handle documentation for citizens of the DPRK who were temporarily in China, and to issue documents to those moving about (luxing). 36 In concluding this note, the embassy added its desire to have the ofªce in Andong set up by 15 August 1950, a date perhaps chosen to coincide with the more positive association of liberation from Japan. Under any other circumstances 15 August would have been considered a tight deadline for setting up such an ofªce in a neighboring sovereign state. Haste, however, was the order of the day. The document appears to have been written rapidly and contains a handful of subtle revelations. The Korean original describes the type of people the Andong ofªce would be helping as "DPRK citizens" (Choson Inmin Minjujui Gonghwaguk kongmin). However, the authors misspelled the word for "country" (guk), dropping the ªnal consonant. This unintentional linguistic amputation, even if just a simple typographical error, constitutes a type of Freudian diplomatic slip reminding us that the DPRK was indeed disintegrating and that the refugees might well have lost their homeland in 1950. 37 The note also functioned as a tangible acknowledgment by the DPRK that it was losing control of its own citizens, many of whom were, in effect, "wandering about" in Manchuria. Such a concession was likely difªcult for the North Koreans to make, but it presaged Kim Il-Sung's abject October request for Chinese intervention on the peninsula.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry moved quickly to respond to North Korea's unusual request. In forwarding the request to the Northeast People's Government in Shenyang, MFA ofªcials stated that "we agree in principle to the request by the Korean embassy" to establish an ofªce in Andong. On 9 August, the MFA answered in the afªrmative via an ofªcial note. 38 However, the establishment of the ofªce was delayed, possibly because "accidental" U.S. air raids that rocked Andong on 24 August and 27 August. These incidents stirred substantial panic in the city and hampered the PRC's ability to handle the refugee problem. 39 At the local level, however, such attacks likely prompted consideration of moving all operations further inland, including those for handling refugees. 40 There would be little sense in setting up facilities so close to the border if General MacArthur decided to relinquish the restrictions under which he had been broadly operating. Possible chaos in the North Korean administration may also have been responsible for the delay. Sinuiju was the logical source for DPRK cadres moving to Andong. 41 Despite these hindrances, by early September the Andong ofªce was in operation. 42 As Kim Il-Sung embarked on his euphemistic "temporary" retreat in October-November 1950, he was pursued by the Far East Air Force (FEAF) commanded by George E. Stratemeyer. Stratemeyer and MacArthur, in coordinating U.S./UN air strategy, assumed that Kim and his government would ºee toward China, the UN forces accordingly showered Sinuiju and the roads leading to that city with bombs. 43 Coupled with U.S. infantry's northward advance, the intense bombardment caused disintegrating KPA units to ºee into Chinese sanctuary to avoid destruction. The neat symmetry this offers has already been remarked upon: China could now repay North Korea for having opened its borders in 1946 and 1947 as a sanctuary to CCP forces reeling from the Chinese Civil War. In 1950, however, as chaos was threatening to overwhelm the border areas, local ofªcials were likely not hearkening back with great clarity to prior years. China was not wholly prepared to handle the outºow of North Korean refugees and was in fact eager to contain the problem. The Chinese government, aided by the North Korean embassy in Beijing, estimated that the number of refugees in China in late 1950 had already surpassed 10,000 people.
In this context, the two or three North Korean consular ofªcials newly arrived in Andong could function only as an inadequate breakwater for the inºux of Korean refugees. Although Andong was the preeminent gateway, North Korean refugees were entering China through multiple corridors. Pressures were being felt along the border crosspoints between Korean Manpo and Chinese Ji'an and, to a lesser extent, in the far northeast between the North Korean province of North Hamgyong and the Chinese Yanbian region. On 4 December 1950, the DPRK embassy in Beijing informed the Chinese MFA of an urgent request to set up a similar ofªce in Tonghua, the urban manufacturing and lumber center for Southeast Jilin Province. Tonghua, however, was about 60 kilometers from the border with North Korea, meaning that tiny and peripheral Ji'an functioned as the actual gateway to China from North Korea. Apart from its ancient Koguryo tombs, Ji'an's main asset was its link to the North Korean city of Manpo via a black iron bridge built by the Japanese in the colonial period and protected by a blockhouse. 44 But this steel remnant of Japanese colonial rule was not matched by Chinese administrative muscle. Ji'an was still just a county-level administration and lacked the infrastructure necessary for housing large numbers of refugees. 45 Because tens of thousands of Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) were being dispatched to Korea via the Ji'an bridge, the ºow of refugees traveling in the reverse direction (i.e., into China) had to be stanched or moved to another area. The need to clear refugees from Ji'an was emphasized on 8 November in a note from the Northeast People's Government to the Chinese MFA disagreeing with a plan that would have kept friendly socialist ambassadors, such as the Polish ambassador to Pyongyang, and their respective staffs in Ji'an. Instead, Gao Gang told Zhou, ambassadors should be moved to Shenyang, a city with much better capacity to handle large numbers of foreigners. 46 By 10 December 1950, Zhou Enlai and his vice foreign ministers agreed to allow the Koreans to set up an ofªce in Tonghua.
The request for the Tonghua ofªce arrived on 4 December, coinciding with the fall of Pyongyang to Chinese forces and Kim Il-Sung's visit to Beijing (Tonghua is not exceedingly far from Kanggye, the remote northwestern province to which Kim's cabinet had ºed). 47 The request indicated that battleªeld victories by the reconstituted KPA and Chinese forces were by no means stanching the ºow of refugees. Because of the prevailing near-paranoia toward outside inºuence, the local governments were expected to give North Koreans a wide berth. Tonghua was already serving as a staging point for the PRC's rapid reception of Korean groups, many of which came nearly unannounced to Beijing. (These groups were yet another drain on Zhou Enlai's time from as early as August 1950.) Although most of these groups were ªrst received in Andong, Tonghua, or Shenyang, many of them did not give the central government much warning about their arrival in the capital. The inºux of often-undocumented foreign nationals into Beijing was likely unnerving to the Chinese and shows the sometimes tentative nature of communications between Shenyang's Northeast People's Government and the MFA. 48 Responding to the Northeast People's Government, Zhou placated Gao Gang by subtly phrasing the order as a request. He also gave the North Koreans the impression that the Chinese central government needed to deliberate about the matter when in fact he had been planning all along to accept the request.
Tonghua has a rich history as a base for northeast Asian governments in exile. The city was the designated alternate capital for Pu Yi's disintegrating Manchukuo regime in August 1945, and Japanese troops held out in the area until February 1946. 49 In December 1950, Tonghua was apparently under consideration as a destination for the ºight of the North Korean government. On 4 October 1950, Stalin had suggested that Kim Il-Sung retreat into Manchuria with a government-in-exile. Although the Chinese were opposed to the idea-their invasion of Korea could be seen as an action undertaken to prevent such a scenario-Tonghua was likely seen as the contingency base for the Korean government. 50 The request for the consulates in the northeast serves as a reminder that if the CPV had not joined the war in Korea, these consular ofªces might have served as foundations for a resumption of that all-toofamiliar aspect of the twentieth century, the Korean government in exile. As the head of a beleaguered and nearly destroyed state in 1950, Kim Il-Sung had at least foreseen the need to keep rear bases in mind, as he had enjoined his cadres in 1945. 51 However, he most likely did not have in mind a retreat into the very areas where he had plied revolution twenty years earlier. 52 For all of China's strident public rhetoric about the "territorial integrity" of the northeast region, Zhou Enlai appeared willing to be supremely ºexible where war allies were concerned. This ºexibility also extended to moving "Soviet-ethnicity" pilots from Sinuiju to Andong and then on to Shenyang. 53 Given the fanfare with which the CCP had expelled U.S. consulates from the northeast urban centers of Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin in 1948 and 1950, the accusations of U.S. and Japanese spying, and the suspicions that certain Koreans remained linked to Japanese intelligence, the speed of the afªrmative MFA response to the North Korean requests is striking. 54 Ongoing local bureaucratic tussles over management of Russians, Japanese, and Koreans already resident in multiethnic Manchuria indicate Zhou Enlai's determination to push the pro-Korean policy over the implicit objections of the Northeast People's Government. 55 The North Korean request ran precisely counter to the general trend of exodus from the northeast. 56 Perhaps in taking into account Beijing's rationale for sending troops to Korea, the desire to prevent a far larger number of refugees from settling in northeastern China should be considered in light of the new evidence. At the same time, the assent to the North Korean request shows that the PRC did not want to, and could not, handle the refugee issue unilaterally.
The North Korean authorities also relied on a North Korean commercial delegation to keep contacts with the Beijing government and, as important, the Northeast People's Government led by Gao Gang. A Northeast business delegation in Korea (Dongbei zhu Chaoxian shangye daibiaotuan) facilitated wartime communication between the DPRK and the Chinese MFA. Alternative methods and channels for resolving bilateral issues and for receiving aid came to the fore. In addition to connecting with the commercial delegation from Pyongyang, China's bureaucratic reach extended even into the North Korean postal system, which had completely broken down, and to working out communications to China from major North Korean cities. 57 The problem of telegraphs in North Korea had multiplied, and the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang, though itself struggling to continue work during punishing bombings, had become the de facto coordinator of the communications of other proletarian embassies in North Korea. The Chinese chargé d'affaires, Chai Junwu (later known as Chai Chengwen), ªlling in for the ailing Ambassador Ni Zhiliang, noted in 1950: "The Koreans want to connect to our sys- tem (or need help from telegraph bureaus) via Ji'an or Tonghua; a lot of embassies in Korea have this need." 58 A telephone line from Chongjin, the northeastern Korean port city and capital of North Hamgyong Province, to Changchun, the heart of Chinese Manchuria, was also discussed, apparently at the PRC's urging.
Educational Exchanges
Physical bombardment and warfare created more than just refugees in North Korea. The war badly mauled the North Korean education system, a system that prior to the war was seen as a prime state achievement. Dislocations, deaths, and the war's voracious need for manpower eviscerated North Korea's wartime schools. Not wanting to completely disrupt the development of educated cadres, however, the DPRK recognized that not all students could serve their country on the battleªeld. Thus, students whose skills were deemed too important to risk on the battleªeld were evacuated to China where they could continue their studies without handicap. Not just soldiers, but interpreters and the intelligentsia faced great dangers in Korea, a notion reinforced by the death of Mao Zedong's eldest son, a Russian-language interpreter, in a U.S. napalm raid in Korea in 1950. The DPRK, stressing the need to shelter its educated citizenry, asked the Chinese government to provide temporary accommodation for its most promising students in a variety of disciplines. The Chinese government responded positively to most requests and offered students opportunities to study in Beijing and the northeast, including at universities around Yanbian. Allegedly, these students were sometimes handpicked by Kim Il-Sung. (Kim Jong-Il, although his name cannot be found in MFA documents, was one of the young students sent to northeastern China during the war.) 59 Toward the end of 1952, Kim Il-Sung, having been relieved of military command by Peng Dehuai, was focusing on culture and plans for rebuilding Pyongyang as a socialist capital. 60 As part of this drive, the North Korean leader selected 50 students and cadres from within the party, government, and military to go to China to study English. 61 These English-language students joined other traditional students studying abroad in the PRC during the Korean War. 62 The DPRK especially wanted to develop Korean technicians and gained permission for large numbers of them to study in China. These technicians were of great beneªt during the postwar reconstruction in North Korea. In August 1952, the North Korean Foreign Ministry requested that 2,150 students and researchers from Kim Chaek University of Technology, the Southern University of Technology, and Wonsan Agricultural University be admitted to China. The North Koreans acknowledged that "for students to progress in their studies in Korea" was "very difªcult," thus necessitating their relocation to China. 63 North Korean workers in China were joined by doctors, pharmacists, and other specialists for additional training. The November 1953 economic and cultural agreements formalized exchange programs, but international students had been coming to China prior to the signing of this agreement. As early as July 1953, 200 workers from the Ministry of Heavy Industry were sent to China for a six-month program. 64 By 1954, more than 2,963 Koreans had been or were in China developing skills to beneªt their homeland. 65 Instead of being a burden on China, these educated North Koreans were often an asset to the development of China's northeast, and some even promised to bring their own grain to avoid depleting China's limited material resources. The PRC was eager to establish itself as a socialist center of Asian civilization and did so by moving ahead in areas in which the USSR was less dominant, such as students, the arts, and women's groups. The inºow of North Korean students and artists to China in 1952 and 1953 may well have occurred absent the Korean War and its daily aerial devastation and creeping famine. Students, artists, and performing arts delegations all had ªnite tasks and limited stays in China-quite unlike the most problematic refugees.
Even in the midst of rapid changes and military coordination, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai took responsibility for guiding the movements of elite North Koreans into China. On 9 November 1950, Zhou made signiªcant revisions to a note about handling the relocation of a famous North Korean dancer, Chae Chongju, who wished to leave North Korea and move her school, including her students, to Beijing. Zhou approved the matter with extensive commentary, ordering that the MFA's cultural ofªce facilitate the school's transportation to Beijing. 66 In this way, the Chinese became the literal guardians of North Korean culture during the war.
The war accelerated the trend of cultural exchange and cross-border ºows of composers, dancers, artists, and writers-as well as soldiers-between the PRC and the DPRK. Although the DRPK was the recipient of this aid, the North Korean government demonstrated considerable agency in soliciting the donations. Sending North Korean arts delegations to China as well as to the USSR and East European "people's democracies" became an effective means of stimulating aid during the Korean War. 67 Korean orphans in particular were recognized as a major asset at beneªt concerts and events because donations by foreign audiences always spiked when they were present.
Aid and Reconstruction
By the time the Korean War ceaseªre agreement was signed in July 1953, North Korea was in ruins. Throughout the war, China had urged North Korea to make speedy repairs to infrastructure, particularly sites that served both military and transportation purposes (e.g., airports), and had coordinated with the North in making those repairs. 68 To avoid losing costly machinery and factory tools in cities such as Pyongyang and Kaesong, North Korea had requested that the goods be stowed in northeastern China for the duration of the war. 69 Despite these efforts to minimize damage, however, both the physi-cal infrastructure and the economy of North Korea had suffered immensely. 70 Chinese aid and support in reconstruction was thus viewed both positively and as a necessity by the North Koreans.
Shortages in agricultural output in the early 1950s required the North Koreans to turn to their Communist allies. 71 Food shortages became a recurring problem throughout the war and after but were always met with a swift response from the Chinese. Although for a time hesitant to reveal the problems plaguing the rural areas, DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong eventually divulged to his Chinese comrades that perhaps 27 percent of the population in rural areas was starving. To remedy the situation, the USSR and China quickly appropriated funds for deliveries and supplanted North Korean food stocks in 1952. 72 The Chinese were probably not surprised to hear that the DPRK's food stocks were insufªcient. North Korea's perennial need for food aid had at that time already become a source of tension in the Sino-North Korean relationship. In January 1951, Peng Dehuai had levied several strong complaints against the North Koreans for poor planning. The most serious problem, he said, was that the North Koreans were failing to provide refugees in the "newly liberated areas" (xin jie fang qu) south of the 38th parallel with food and fuel. Instead, North Korean ineptitude resulted in only enough basic necessities for soldiers, which in turn fostered social unrest and the formation of local gangs and cliques. 73 Hungarian documents suggest that the Chinese, not wanting to funnel money away carelessly, became more critical of North Korea's economic policies in the mid-1950s. 74 Still, the Chinese were unwilling to let social unrest boil over in North Korea. 75 The derision the North Koreans received from Peng Dehuai was lim-ited to internal dialogue among the Chinese and did not necessarily narrow the scope of Chinese generosity. Peng himself was committed to delivering aid. In a discussion with Pak Hon-yong, he remarked:
They say that our government has already resolved to deliver to the Korean government 30,000 tons of grain. I do not know, is this true? If it is not true, I consider that it is necessary to prepare for timely delivery of 30,000 tons of grain in March for the purpose of providing assistance so that the peasants can engage in spring planting. 76 From February to May 1952, the Chinese delivered 5,000 tons of rice, 5,000 tons of chumiza, and 200 tons of bean oil each month to the North Koreans. 77 From January 1954 to September 1955, China transferred 300,000 tons of grain to North Korea. 78 Peng Dehuai's personal role in arguing for this aid is assumed, but published documentation such as his Nianpu (Chronology) offers only brief glimpses of this signiªcant issue. 79 North Korean views of Peng Dehuai are similarly difªcult to assess. Letters of thanks to him from Kim Tubong and Pak Han-yong are newly available but do little to expose disagreements between Peng and his North Korean colleagues. 80 Both before and after the war, the Chinese press was quite kind to the North Koreans, playing up the close cooperation between Pak, Kim Il-Sung, and Peng.
The Chinese also provided extensive monetary aid and were willing to subsidize trade with North Korea, a policy dating back to the war years as advocated by Peng Dehuai. Answering Peng's request for Chinese ªscal aid to North Korea in 1952, Mao agreed that 1.6 million yuan was urgently needed, even though he noted that this amount "exceeds the sum of the trade credit extended by China to Korea in 1951." 81 Thus, when CIA analysts predicted in May 1953 that the PRC "desires to increase its economic inºuence in North Korea," they were accurately noting the growth of an existing trend. 82 After the war ended, Kim Il-Sung traveled to both the USSR and China in search of economic aid. He arrived in Beijing on 10 November and stayed until 27 November, hammering out the details of cooperative agreements in the ªelds of economics and culture. On 23 November, North Korea and China signed an economic pact, the beneªts of which were heavily slanted toward the DPRK. 83 Beijing offered 800 million yuan in grants, delivering 550 million yuan of promised aid in 1954 and 1955. Furthermore, Kim learned, much to his delight, that the PRC had cancelled all of North Korea's debt from the Korean War. 84 Chinese aid outweighed that of the Soviet Union for some time, although aid from each country served different purposes. China predominantly supplied non-durable items (consumer products), whereas the Soviet Union focused on durable goods (capital goods). Thus, although China funneled more into North Korea in the immediate postwar years, the long-term beneªt of Soviet aid and investment was probably greater. 85 East German aid during the same period was also substantial, presumably adding to the weight of Soviet-inºuenced contributions, although even the East Germans were attracted to Mao and his alternate Communist model. 86 The November 1953 economic pact mandated that Chinese monetary aid be used for food, textiles, cotton, coal, ªshing vessels, farm equipment, and paper, as well as for reconstruction supplies, machinery, and railroad repairs. 87 China also became the largest supplier of consumer goods to North Korea, ºooding the market with clothing, toiletries, and utensils. 88 As Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee have noted, even cursory glances through North Korean journals of the time indicate that KPA troops wore Chinesemade clothing and were at times equipped with Chinese riºes. Even in DPRK science laboratories, North Korean students wore Chinese-made garments. 89 U.S. bombing raids had wiped out building materials and brickyards, leaving the North Koreans with little to rebuild their shattered country. 90 Setting priorities in such a context was difªcult. Construction of factories and housing meant that North Korea had to revive its cement industry. Cement factories were producing one million tons annually at the height of the period of Japanese control, but these facilities were devastated during the Korean War. Output in 1954 was approximately one-fourth of the production ªgures during Japan's occupation. In areas like Hamhung, North Korea's inability to surpass colonial-era production occurred because the United States had used Japanese blueprints to bomb factories more efªciently. 91 The slow pace of North Korean industrial recovery heightened the signiªcance of PRC-sponsored cement shipments to the DPRK for the postwar reconstruction. In 1953-1954, China delivered 100,000 tons of cement. 92 With the help of East German engineers in Hamhung, the DPRK used Chinese cement to rebuild its infrastructure and erect new apartment ºats.
On the macro-level, China was a safe source of aid for the North. Although the Soviet Union remained the North's foremost ªnancial benefactor in reconstructing factories, the PRC also made signiªcant contributions on this matter. The Chinese rebuilt the Namp'o Glass Works and, complementing their deliveries of consumer goods, constructed a consumer goods manufacturing plant in 1954. Beijing also saw that the new railways in North Korea had general stores alongside them, building such structures in Pyongyang, Ch'ongju, and Kowon. The stores were entirely funded by the PRC. Chinese soldiers also rebuilt important buildings, such as those housing the Foreign Ministry and the national bank. 93 Although smaller socialist states were engaged in similar types of postwar aid, the PRC-unlike the smaller states; for example, the German Democratic Republic-accomplished its goals in North Korea without massive propaganda campaigns emphasizing its public contributions to North Korean restoration. 94 Apart from a smaller number of graphic publications for domestic consumption, the Chinese tended to emphasize military heroism in war while deemphasizing their central role in rebuilding the North Korean economy. The effort to play down China's role stemmed from the PRC's desire to avoid antagonizing the North Koreans.
Perhaps in no other area did China's commitment to rebuild North Korea after the war shine through with more clarity than in the activities of the CPV from 1953 to 1958. Apart from their obvious role as a deterrent to the South, these troops also ªlled labor shortages and rebuilt infrastructure. Their importance to postwar reconstruction should not be underemphasized. 95 CPV involvement in reconstructing North Korea's rail system was signiªcant. Chinese vessels could move unhindered between ports in Dalian and Andong and Sinuiju, carrying supplies and aid. The Chinese were quite concerned, however, about land transportation and in linking the railways in North Korea with those in northeastern China. 96 Thus, both during the war and after, the highest Chinese leaders concerned themselves with rebuilding transportation systems and saw that Chinese soldiers in North Korea worked alongside KPA troops to rebuild the railways. 97 The CIA estimated that as many as 40,000 Chinese railway workers and 54,000 construction workers from northeast China were living in North Korea. 98 Although these numbers cannot yet be veriªed in the Chinese archives, even if the CIA estimates are inaccurate by a factor of ten, such aid would still be signiªcant. Chinese efforts to reconstruct North Korea's transportation systems added agility and strength to the North Korean economy. This aspect of Sino-North Korean cooperation sufªciently worried the U.S./UN forces in Korea that they attempted, in leaºets dropped in profusion on North Korea, to make a major issue of Chinese control of the transportation system, asserting that China was behaving arrogantly and was unconcerned about North Korean civilians. 99 However, rail ties between the two countries were not without their difªculties. In the Chinese border city of Ji'an in 1954, a train arriving from North Korea killed two Chinese workers, resulting in a distressed local populace and worried internal dialogue in the Chinese MFA about handling the case discreetly. The North Koreans, whose KPA soldiers had been running the train, asserted that they were not at fault; Chinese reports on the incident asserted recklessness by the KPA. Annoyed by the lack of information forthcoming from the North Korean side, Chinese bureaucrats sought to ªnd out the North Korean military regulations for such incidents. 100 Word of the Ji'an deaths no doubt raced through local communities, and, although the deaths were not publicized in northeastern newspapers, they put a sharper edge on the "brotherly" attitude toward North Korea with which the Chinese regime sought to inculcate its citizens and soldiers in the border regions.
The CPV also caused problems in North Korea, as could the soldiers' Chinese counterparts living as civilians in the DPRK. At times, the CPV's presence became overbearing and imperious, resulting in what North Koreans perceived as ºagrant violations of their national sovereignty. In 1954, controversy arose about whether the CPV was permitted to hang the PRC ºag in North Korea. Wanting to avoid potential problems with the North Korean government, the Chinese MFA instructed the PLA that the ºag could be raised only if the North Koreans had no objections. 101 The inevitable relations between lonely CPV soldiers and North Korean women (some of them wartime widows) also caused problems, albeit ones that were rarely discussed. 102 U.S. and South Korean propaganda leaºets that had blanketed North Korea during the war had repeatedly drummed on themes such as the supposed dirtiness, hunger, and imperious nature of the CPV. 103 Chinese soldiers may also have noted with more than saintly detachment the reported postwar spike in libidinous activity among North Korean youth no longer oppressed by war's dislocations. 104 In all cases, the uncertainty accorded to North Korean national sovereignty, implicit in the stationing of CPV units across Korea, highlighted the sensitivities present. Interviews with CPV veterans, such as those conducted by Li Xiaobing, surveys of memoirs by veterans, and careful analysis of propaganda ªlms from the 1950s depicting the CPV in North Korea might ªll in some of the gaps in the study of the social role or function played by Chinese troops. 105 Further work can also be done in the MFA Archive.
Conclusion
Chinese soldiers remained in the DPRK for an additional ªve years, and their interaction with the North Korean state and populace remains a signiªcant research frontier for scholars of the Cold War. In measuring the amount of work left to be done by historians of Northeast Asia, one might juxtapose the current scattering of scholarship regarding the Chinese "occupation" of North Korea with Norman Naimark's immense, admirable monograph on the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany. 106 The gap is great and in need of ªlling. Yet many of the relevant archives-particularly, regional Chinese archives-are closed to Western scholars, and Chinese scholars are too often unable to publish their writings on Sino-North Korean relations because of the tremendous political sensitivities of the sharp-eyed-and vocal-readers in the North Korean embassy in Beijing. We might have to await a new crop of fearless Chinese graduate students or South Korean scholars trained in China to unearth or explain these issues in their full complexity. 107 In addition to the issues raised in this article, the MFA Archive contains several additional groups of documents whose analysis might shed further light on China's relations with North Korea in the 1950s. Bacteriological warfare (BW) allegations in 1952 and 1953 were an important means of cementing Sino-North Korean solidarity, and a handful of new documents indicate an earlier coordinating interest in the matter. North Korean interest in China's re-search on Japanese BW crimes dates back at least to December 1949, when the authorities in Beijing began publicizing Soviet trials of Unit 731 members at Khabarovsk. Did China's drive to stamp out the legacies of Japan's hated Unit 731 signiªcantly affect North Korean Health Ministry ofªcials, particularly when such educated leaders were likely spending time in northeast China before 1952? A related question regards the degree of propaganda coordination that had occurred between the two sides prior to the biological warfare allegations of February 1952. Chinese leader Guo Moruo played an active role in propagandizing the BW issue and the Chinese cause within North Korea and globally, and his trips to Pyongyang and Sinuiju might be proªtably analyzed.
Local Chinese archives are the next frontier, but in the meantime even indepth studies based on local newspapers or publications (difangzhi) would sufªce for improving our understanding of Chinese-North Korean dynamics both near the border and beyond. Work by doctoral students and other young scholars tramping around Manchuria, as well as by those ªguratively plundering the immense cache of captured North Korean documents in College Park, Maryland, remain promising and interesting. 108 What is most needed is greater study of interactions at the county and city level in what might be called the Sino-North Korean "contact zones." 109 The persistent work by scholars to peer around the edge of North Korean archives has also yielded some gains. Further gains might be possible if some kind of academic exchange were included as part of a diplomatic agreement with the North.
Divergent pasts in East Asia frequently reveal their ability to interfere with a common future, and North Korea is no exception. The history of China's inºuence on North Korea may provide food for thought today. Although policymakers seem to have grasped that the relationship with the PRC is North Korea's most important bilateral relationship by far, the tensions and speciªc issues inherent in the alliance are rarely understood. Understanding the historical underpinnings of the relationship and how the PRC has responded to past humanitarian and political crises in North Korea is highly instructive. North Korea has largely purged the PRC from its own stylized history, but political changes on the peninsula, particularly if they result in a more vigorous Chinese role-a role surely contemplated by DPRK diplomats on those long and instructive train rides from Sinuiju to Beijing-may eventually return North Korea to its Chinese past.
